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When I received the kind invitation of SUERF to give the Marjolin Lecture at the
Frankfurt Colloquium of SUERF I became enthusiastic, because there is for me a close
link between Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe and the name of Robert
Marjolin. My introduction to the subject of Europe’s monetary integration in fact goes
back to my participation in a group headed by Robert Marjolin in 1974-75, exactly
twenty-five years ago.
At that time the Werner plan, drawn up in 1970 by a group of high European
officials, was in disarray.  The eruption of high inflation following the oil price hike of
1973-74 and the transition to floating exchange rates had made the international
environment for this ambitious undertaking too hostile. In the winter of 1973-74 the
European Commission therefore decided to have a group of independent experts study
whether EMU by 1980 as still possible.
Several prominent economists with highly sceptical views about EMU joined the
group. Notable amongst them were Professor Herbert Giersch of Kiel and Sir Donald
McDougall, then Chief Adviser to the Confederation of British Industries. There were also
more positive voices such as Professor Hans Bosman, already then Secretary-General of
SUERF, whose presence in this colloquium I deeply miss. Hans Bosman was a great
European and contributed substantially to the debates in the Marjolin group. There was
also Bernard Clappier, later to became Governor of the Banque de France and an architect
of the European Monetary System (EMS). His view was that EMU might have been
feasible if officials had been bolder in 1970 and had moved much more rapidly to locking
up exchange rates. I also count myself among the optimistic members of the group in
these dark moments of the 1970's. But in the end we were all persuaded to sign up to a
sceptical report in April 1975, see Marjolin et al. (1975). Robert Marjolin himself has
briefly and brutally summarized the conclusions from this report in his memoirs written
shortly before his death in 1986, i.e. a decade later, see Marjolin (1986).
In his memoirs Marjolin does not devote many pages to his presidency of the
EMU group named after him. This of course was to be expected for someone who had
achieved much greater things in life than chairing a committee. Robert Marjolin came to
the group with his rich experience, first as Secretary General of the OEEC from 1948
when he was only 37 and ten years later as the first Vice-President for Economic Affairs3
of new European Commission. Marjolin also brought, particularly from the former of
these experiences and from his many links to the United States, a global perspective on
Europe’s integration. He speaks in his memoirs of “the illusion of Economic and
Monetary Union” and he criticizes politicians for seeing EMU as a substitute for political
union. Marjolin further noted (in 1975) that “national economic and monetary policies
have never in 25 years been more discordant”. Indeed, 1975 when the report appeared was
marked not only by double-digit inflation, but by inflation rates of 20-25% in Italy and
the United Kingdom. Europe was about to enter a cycle of devaluation and inflation.
While we worked in the group France was mostly outside the currency snake, the
rudimentary exchange-rate arrangement that had been put in place in 1972 as the main
legacy of the Werner report. The Marjolin Report pointed to an absence on the part of
politicians on any real understanding of what was involved in EMU and it encouraged
governments “to concentrate on the immediate problems of inflation, balance of payment
deficits and unemployment”.
With a certain pride Marjolin noted in 1986 that the report he presided over had
its effect: “there was no more talk of EMU”. He speculates whether the report may have
contributed indirectly to the creation of the EMS three years later, but he also states that
it would absurd to speak of a practical arrangement such as the EMS as being a step
towards to full monetary union.
I wish Robert Marjolin would still be here to continue the argument. Some of the
conclusions of his report have stood the test of time; others have not. The EMS did in the
end turn out to be a step towards to EMU, both in its long and successful survival and,
more paradoxically, in its demise in 1992-93. And, in the long run, EMU may well turn
out to be the best possible solution to preserving the priorities of low inflation and the
containment of balance-of-payment imbalances and hence to meeting a precondition for
addressing Europe’s current main problem - unemployment. 
In the following I want to trace the ambitions of European monetary integration
as they evolved over the past twenty five years. I note five major ambitions and survey
how they evolved, gradually gaining ground and overcoming the opposition, mostly from
national policy makers, but also - and sadly from my point of view - from a majority of
academic economists. The five evolving ambitions are the following:4
1Some of the subsequent analysis has been developed in two earlier papers presenting
our work on European monetary integration, see Thygesen (1998) and Thygesen (1999).
< reducing, then eliminating nominal exchange-rate fluctuations;
< reducing, then eliminating inflation;
< developing rules for non-monetary national policies, then scope for
coordinating them without undermining the rules;
< developing a potential role in the international monetary system, then
adjusting it to the realities of today; and
< developing a European profile in financial regulation?
Truthfully only the first three, or may be more correctly two and a half, of these
ambitions can be said to have been fulfilled with  EMU as it has started on 1 January
1999. There are still unfulfilled ambitions. In any case, to start the discussion it is
necessary to go back to the origins of the EMS or even further. In doing so I rely heavily
on joint work with Daniel Gros, embodied in a book that we first published in 1992 and
have published in a significantly revised second edition, Gros and Thygesen (1998).
1 
Reducing, then eliminating nominal exchange rate fluctuations
The reduction  -  and finally elimination  -  of exchange-rate fluctuations must be
said to have been the core achievement of the two decades since 1978. The European
Monetary System evolved gradually from damage limitation via joint exchange-rate
management to almost stable rates in the beginning of the 1990s. In the first four years of
the system exchange-rate changes were still frequent; seven of them occurred in these four
years. The system gradually firmed up over the next four years from March 1983,
constraining exchange-rate fluctuations quite successfully, as countries tried to converge
on Germany. From January 1987 a period of fully stabilized exchange rates followed and
it lasted until September 1992. Towards the end of that period it even became fashionable
to talk as if Europe was already in a quasi-monetary union.
A common currency was identified in the Delors Report (1989) as necessary for
the final stage of Europe monetary unification. This was a remarkable development; in the5
late 1980s the ambition talked about was initially just to have fully locked exchange rates.
But it was recognized that it was very difficult to foresee that exchange rates could
become “irrevocably” locked in the absence of a common monetary authority and indeed
a common monetary unit. The evolution of the ambition to go all the way to a common
currency implied that one moved from coordinating national policies and integrating
financial markets to full-scale unification. That in turn implied a significant simplification
of the task of monetary policy because one would then move to a more familiar “national”
model.
In his remarkable book The Road to Monetary Union in Europe Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa (1994) notes that the utopian perspective of full currency union was confirmed
as a realistic option by the 1992-93 crises in the EMS. With the degree of capital mobility
achieved at the end of the 1980s, fixed-but-adjustable exchange-rates might have become
impossible to maintain. Central bankers  found it difficult to face this issue and claimed
in most cases that the experience with the EMS was sufficiently promising to aim no
further than a well-functioning EMS. It is more surprising  that many, if not most,
academic economists also found it extremely difficult to accept this ambition as
reasonable in economic terms. I suggest that this is due to two important biases in much
of the economic analysis  of full monetary union. The first is that the alternative to EMU
is viewed in too optimistic a perspective. The second is that the issue of asymmetric
shocks affecting the participants in EMU in a differential way has been played up too
much in the economic debate, confounding the possible with the probable. Finally most
of the academic discussion seems to have underestimated the benefits of fully eliminating
exchange-rate fluctuations.
The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) has provided the economist with
a useful check-list for the evaluation of whether an economy could derive net benefits
from participating in a monetary union with one or more of its trading partners.
Unfortunately the vagueness and the static character of the proposed criteria as well as
their failure to give full attention to the alternative to monetary union has in my view
imparted a certain bias against EMU in much of the academic literature on the subject.
That in turn has left many economists and non-economists alike with the conclusion that
EMU must be a project that can only be understood in political terms.6
Nobody will deny that EMU has a political inspiration which may well have been
dominant for some of the main actors in the process, such as Chancellor Kohl. But
monetary union would not have come about if it did not have a stronger backing in
economic arguments as perceived by large segments of business, trade unions and
financial market participants than the bulk of the professional economics literature
suggests. What are the causes of this gap in perceptions? And who is closer to reality?
May be the main weakness of the analytical framework of OCA theory lies in its
inadequate attention to the alternative. It implicitly assumes that the alternative to a
country’s participation in a monetary union is either a well-functioning system of tightly
managed exchange rates where rare realignments of parities are undertaken in situations
of major country-specific or asymmetric disturbances without upsetting otherwise stable
foreign-exchange markets, or a system of floating rates reminiscent of the ideal state of
Friedman’s classic 1953-case for flexible rates where markets smoothly provide a safety
valve for the adjustment to residual differences between economic performances and/or
policies in two areas. Both of these benchmark cases appear excessively optimistic when
one considers a realistic overall alternative to EMU.
On important occasions the former of the two benchmarks received official status.
The European Commission, usually not suspect of bias against monetary union, no doubt
in its major report One Market, One Money of 1990 considerably underestimated the
potential gains of realising EMU by comparing it to a continuation of the apparently
successful tight EMS which existed at the time. The benefits of eliminating the small
residual exchange-rate variability of the early 1990s were perceived to be small, though
larger than the additional costs which had already been borne. In a surprising show of
confidence some central bankers even said that should EMU fail to be implemented, the
informal and pragmatic cooperation between central banks in the ERM had become
sufficiently robust to largely reproduce the effect desired with EMU.
The foreign-exchange turmoil in 1992-93 demonstrated that any such confidence
was misplaced. A system of fixed exchange rates where the possibility of realignments
has not been excluded is very vulnerable in a state of high capital mobility which pushes
countries beyond cooperation towards full-scale abolition of national monetary autonomy.7
Without this final step, the ERM would remain prone to speculative attacks, as Padoa-
Schioppa had already argued in 1988.
Models for such attacks had originally been inspired by observations of national
monetary policies gradually leading to the exhaustion of international reserves required
to defend the parity. Since financial market participants would be able to foresee the time
of exhaustion they would attack earlier and precipitate a collapse. The crises for some
currencies in 1992 - lira, peseta and Swedish krona - provide illustrations of this so-called
“first-generation model” of speculative attacks. Many European officials were reluctant
to admit the relevance of this model, because the EMS was in principle based on
unlimited mandatory interventions, while at the same time the access to borrowing was
growing rapidly for the participants. However, in September 1992 the Bundesbank
reminded others that interventions could not in practice be unlimited as long as monetary
policies were only imperfectly coordinated. The reminder has been repeated in the
framework arrangement for cooperation between the euro area and non-participating EU
currencies which has replaced the EMS at the start of EMU.
In the early months of 1993 and again over the summer there were new
speculative attacks, this time on several currencies believed to have sufficiently sound
fundamentals for the first-generation models to be inapplicable. These attacks can be
illustrated by the so-called “second-generation models”:  speculators gain if they have
correctly anticipated reluctance among the officials responsible to continue to bear the
costs of defending the parity by means of high domestic interest rates. As recession
dragged on, France was seen to develop such reluctance and a growing temptation to
follow the British example of exit from the system in the previous year.
These expectations proved unfounded in 1993 - there was no easing of monetary
policy in France or in other EMS countries, even after governments and central banks in
August 1993 took the unexpected, but in retrospect logical, step of widening the margins
of fluctuation to ±15%. That created “two-way risk” for speculators while the mainte-
nance of the central rates indicated that fundamentals were unchanged. This lax system
functioned well over more than five years when it became ever tighter, but one should not
interpret this as evidence that the participants have finally found a robust compromise
between fixed and flexible exchange rates: the disciplining force of approaching the final8
deadline for monetary union had then become the major factor constraining behaviour.
If the calls from Britain and from Continental critics for postponing the start of
EMU to await a longer period of convergence had been accommodated, the EMU-
participants would no doubt have tried to hold on to central rates within wide margins for
an extended transition. But it is unrealistic to expect that such a strategy could have
continued to convince financial markets of its stability. Minor policy shifts in divergent
directions would have become subject to over-interpretations; it is particularly doubtful
if the system could have survived one or more realignments.
A system of managed exchange rates where changes are confined to relatively
rare occasions of “fundamental disequilibrium” would for these reasons have been unable
to provide an acceptable alternative to monetary union. Could the other benchmark of
flexible exchange rates have done so, provided fluctuations were dampened by a
commitment of the countries concerned to low and broadly parallel inflation rates? This
is of particular interest to countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden which have
chosen initially to stand apart from EMU, but have introduced national inflation targets,
apparently fully consistent with stable exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro.
Unfortunately the answer appears to be negative. The experience with inflation
targets suggests that even when the policy delivers the main result intended - a low and
stable inflation rate - it does not deliver a high degree of exchange-rate stability at the
same time. Canada has had an impressive inflation record over a number of years, similar
to or better than that of the United States. This has not prevented the Canadian dollar from
fluctuating very significantly against the US dollar. More to the point: UK inflation
broadly parallel to Continental European inflation has not prevented sterling from moving
over a wide range between DEM 2.25 and 3.10 over the past three years. If one were to
take the mid-point of this range as close to a longer-run equilibrium it is necessary to
reflect on the cost both to the UK economy and to those of its trading partners of swings
of ±15% in both directions. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that the movements
observed in sterling since 1992 can be explained primarily by movements in relative fun-
damentals. Even the Bank of England described the strength of sterling in early 1998 as
“erratic”.9
If one presents the alternative to monetary union as either a system of managed
exchange rates prone to recurrent speculative attacks or as a régime of flexible rates
marked, even in relatively propitious circumstances, by excess volatility of rates the
conclusion changes from that where EMU is compared either to a well-managed
discretionary system where exchange-rate changes remain as a useful instrument of
macroeconomic adjustment - or to a flexible system where the exchange rate functions as
a safety valve. It should be a cause for soul-searching to economists why they emphasize
the random and volatile nature of exchange rates when teaching international economics
while adopting a very different posture when they review the pros and cons  of EMU. A
less biased question would be whether monetary union eliminates costly exchange-rate
volatility to a degree which makes the lost opportunity of allowing the exchange rate to
move in the rare cases when such changes could provide an important element in the
macroeconomic adjustment appear acceptable. As you will have gathered my own answer
to this question is yes.
Let me now turn to the second source of bias in the evaluation of the net benefits
of EMU: the assumed prominence of asymmetric shocks affecting the participants in a
differential way. Here again I refer to classical OCA theory. When are changes in the
nominal exchange rate appropriate as part of macroeconomic adjustment? The celebrated
asymmetric or country-specific shocks are seen by many as the essential argument for
preserving national currencies and hence the possibility of adjusting their external value.
Mundell’s pioneering article (1961) took as its starting point demand shifts
between domestic and foreign products in a world of sticky prices and very limited factor
(labour) mobility. Such shifts become more likely, the more specialized the economy is
in its productive structure; Kenen (1969) extended Mundell’s model, which had assumed
full specialization, to diversified economies between which demand shifts are less likely
and in which supply shocks have more similar effects. Whatever will pose a threat to the
survival of EMU, it will hardly be significant demand shift from, say, German to Italian
or Spanish goods - even less so after the start of EMU has unified monetary policy and
imposed constraints on divergences between national budgetary policies. In EMU one will
no doubt continue to observe non-policy disturbances which have a particularly strong
impact on some sectors and industries and hence on regions in which these sectors or
industries are strongly represented. But such regions are unlikely to correspond to national10
states participating in EMU and their problems could not, as Mundell himself was the first
to point out  -  and as he has recently repeated, see Mundell (1998) -  be corrected by a
realignment between national currencies; they should lead to changes in relative prices
and in relative remunerations of the factors used in the production of the sector’s output.
The main question is therefore - in EMU as it was before the project was launched -
whether these mechanisms work more or less well inside any particular country.
This puts the most used argument against EMU - the singling out of asymmetric
shocks as the main obstacle to the single currency  - into a more realistic perspective. It
is not enough to demonstrate that over the past two or three decades the correlation
between GDP growth rates or changes in unemployment in the EU countries has been
much less than perfect. In order to evaluate the need for retaining the exchange rate as an
adjustment mechanism it is necessary to isolate those disturbances which are truly
external in nature, because it is with the purpose of softening the impact of the latter that
OCA-theory advocates reliance on exchange-rate changes. Yet it is only rarely that this
distinction is made. Some researchers adopt an indirect approach by distinguishing
between supply shocks, which should in principle be independent of domestic macroeco-
nomic policies and demand shocks which clearly are not, see notably Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994). But this does not go far enough; some shocks to supply such as wage
explosions have also been generated by divergent economic policies.
Gros and I use a crude method for identifying externally-generated shocks by
looking at the difference between the growth rates of exports from an EU member state
and from the whole of the EU and we report some rather striking examples of differential
performance. Yet such a measure also exaggerates the problem that will be faced in EMU,
as can be illustrated by the example most often quoted of an asymmetric external shock:
the impact of the dissolution of the Soviet Union on the Finnish economy around 1991.
The standard presentation of this case is that the virtual disappearance of an important
trading partner was a decisive asymmetric shock requiring the major devaluations of the
Finnish markka observed in 1991-92.
The facts are that Finnish export volumes overall fell by 6% in 1991; when
compared to a growth rate of exports from EU as a whole of 4.8% this was indeed the
largest single discrepancy in national export performance ever observed. However, the11
main reason was less specific and less external than implied by the standard presentation:
if the Soviet market had develop in line with all of Finlands’s other export markets, total
exports would still have fallen by just over 5%. The dissolution of the USSR, however
dramatic and unique, was not the main explanatory factor: a long inflationary boom in
Finland, fuelled by expansionary policies, had weakened competitiveness and exposed
Finnish industry as recession struck in 1991. Finnish policy-makers have obviously been
content to endorse the OCA perspective of an asymmetric external shock, but this does
not make the story more convincing. Even in this apparently unique case it is necessary
to qualify the measure of the external asymmetric shock in order to make an assessment
relevant to the challenges conceivable in EMU.
Have external, i.e. export, shocks, regardless of their origin, been important in
shaping internal balance - as measured by the most politically sensitive indicator, the
unemployment rate? Somewhat surprisingly, it is not straightforward to demonstrate such
an impact. Among the EU countries the relationship was statistically significant only for
Belgium. If one can not confirm the importance of export shocks for employment changes
that must weaken the assertion that retaining the instrument of exchange-rate adjustments
is essential to good macroeconomic management in the sense of maintaining broadly
satisfactory employment levels.
The implication of this conclusion is, at a minimum, that external shocks would
have to be very large before they have a significant impact on employment. The point can
also be illustrated by the size of the real devaluation required to lower the unemployment
rate by one percentage point in a typical medium-sized EU economy, where the share of
exports in GDP, is about 30%. Over a 2-3 year horizon most macromodels estimate the
elasticity of exports w.r.t. the real exchange rate at about 0.5. It would then take a 20%
real devaluation to produce the increase of output of app. 3% which according to Okun’s
Law, is required to cut one percentage point off the unemployment rate. Although this
back-of-the-envelope calculation disregards the impact on output and employment via
imports, public finances and other indirect channels it does suggest that giving up the use
of exchange-rate changes makes only a modest difference to the macroeconomic
performance of the EU economies.
My final point in the rationalization of why many economists have been critical12
of the move  to full monetary union is that economic analysis has largely neglected the
costs of short-term exchange-rate volatility. While the costs of longer-term swings into
misalignments of currencies have generally been recognized, short-term volatility is
mostly not seem as costly, simply because it is assumed that such disturbances can easily
be hedged through the foreign-exchange market.
It should, however, be uncontroversial that there are transaction costs and other
costs related to exchange-rate volatility which can only be eliminated by the emergence
of the single currency. These costs depend on the degree of variability, since bid-ask
spreads in the foreign-exchange market as well as hedging costs are directly related to the
latter. The most recent research-based estimate in view of the experience of the early and
mid-1990, is about 1% of EU GDP, see IFO (1997); European multinationals typically
regard this as too low a figure. Even disregarding this latter view, the potential gain from
the euro is not negligible - one to two years’ benefits of this order would be enough to
offset the once-and-for-all costs of introducing the euro - though it may not provide a
decisive argument in favour of going all the way to monetary union. There is, however,
an additional argument.
Economists have tended to dismiss further macroeconomic effects of the
elimination of exchange-rate variability with reference to the difficulties experienced in
documenting any major impact on trade flows. Even the least agnostic findings have
suggested a boost to intra-European trade flows of only app. 1% as a result of reducing
volatility, measured by, say, monthly variability of rates to zero. These modest effects
have been rationalized primarily with reference to the ever-extending scope for hedging
currency risks.
I have long had doubts as to whether the macroeconomic effects of exchange-rate
variability were really as limited as these studies suggest. Inspired on the one hand by the
work of Krugman (1989) on the implications of variability for the evolution of a wait-and-
see attitude to international trade where firms follow a “pricing-to-market” strategy and
hence experience major  changes in profit margins when the exchange rate moves, and on
the other hand by the recurrent German debate about the value to Germany of very stable
exchange rates vis-a-vis important European trading partners, Daniel Gros and I tried to
see if we could observe for Germany as well as for other EU member states a direct13
linkage from monthly exchange-rate variability between the EMU-currencies to changes
in the unemployment rate or in the percentage rate of change of employment in
manufacturing. Somewhat to our surprise we initially found significant and quantitatively
important effects on these important indicators of macroeconomic performance for
Germany. As an illustration, the increase in the monthly variability of the DEM against
an index of the other EMU currencies from 1994 to 1995, when European currency
markets again experienced some tensions, may explain a rise of one percentage point in
the overall German unemployment rate, say from 8 to 9%. Subsequently, broadly similar
results have been found by Belke and Gros (1998) for the three other large countries in
the first EMU-group (France, Italy and Spain), though not for the United Kingdom.
Obviously these results are preliminary and suggestive only. Some colleagues
have found them implausible, not least when seen in conjunction with the relatively low
estimates of price elasticities in the trade flows of the EMU-countries which we have also
reported. But the paradox can be explained. It is entirely possible that trade flows could
be more sensitive to changes in the volatility of exchange rates than to changes in their
level; there may even be a trade-off between these two dimensions to the extent that an
increase in volatility, by generating more uncertainty about the more permanent level of
the exchange rate, will tend to reduce price elasticities. That is indeed the argument of
Krugman in his analysis of inertia in observed trade flows when volatility in the dollar-
yen exchange-rate shot up in the 1980's - admittedly more dramatically than anything
witnessed in Europe. This line of reasoning may also help to understand the underlying
support of German industry and trade unions for the participation of Germany in EMU,
in contrast to the usually more vociferous skepticism voiced by German savers vis-a-vis
the project.
It is accordingly not adequate to dismiss the macroeconomic benefits of the single
currency by viewing them as arising only from some relatively modest savings in
transaction and hedging costs. The latter may be the easiest to quantify, but not  the most
important.
My conclusion is that the case for fully eliminating exchange-rate fluctuations by
forming a full monetary union is much stronger on purely economic grounds that has yet
been generally accepted by economists. This does not imply one should  overlook the14
political motivations for creating Europe’s common currency  -  only that these political
motivations, strong as they may have been for some actors, can not explain why this
objective achieved steady support in the business community as clearly has been the case.
The first ambition of EMU has been fulfilled and there are good arguments for being
satisfied with this outcome.
Let me now turn to the second ambition which is more generally accepted by
economists as desirable, namely that of the reducing the inflation rate to a very low rate,
may be even to zero.
Reducing, then eliminating inflation
When the discussion of EMU surfaced during the turbulent years of the 1970s,
the ambition of using European monetary integration as a means of reinforcing anti-
inflationary policies in the members states was initially appealing to liberal academic
economists such as Herbert Giersch, Roland Vaubel, Pascal Salin and Paul de Grauwe -
all of whom have subsequently been sceptical about EMU itself.
I had an early experience with discussions of an ambitious liberal approach to a
European single currency through my participation in a group that drafted the so-called
“All Saints Day Manifesto” which was published by The Economist on 1 November 1975,
see Basevi et al. (1975). The group of nine European economists behind this statement
based themselves on the Hayekian view that competition between different issuers of
national currencies was the best way of reducing the scope for irresponsible and divergent
policies such as those that marked the earlier period of the 1970s. European monetary
integration could do that by offering citizens in inflation-prone countries the choice of an
alternative currency of superior quality.
Hayek elaborated the idea of competition between different currency issuers in
his little volume The Denationalization of Money published in 1976, and he endorsed the
idea of competition between national currencies in Europe in a paper presented in 1980,
see Salin (ed.) (1984). Briefly the idea was to expose nationally-issued currencies to
competition from a new European unit - we called it the Europa - the purchasing power
of which was to be guaranteed by the European authorities jointly. More precisely all15
consumers and firms in Europe would be offered the opportunity of using a unit which
appreciated against any individual European currency in step with its superior inflation
performance as measured by national consumer price indices. This would have put
enormous pressure on countries permitting high inflation rates whereas those with low
inflation rates might have been able to successfully defend their national currency domain
for quite some time. The proposal was arguably naive and excessively brutal; it seems
unlikely that European governments could ever have agreed to the joint issue of a
completely stable currency in competition with their own much weaker ones; that would
no doubt have been perceived as too risky. The group had considerable difficulties in
persuading The Economist to publish this radical idea, not least for this reason. There was
also a major weakness in the scheme, soon pointed out in the subsequent debate: the plan
was designed for the transition to the single currency rather than for managing the single
currency subsequently. During the transition period the constant purchasing power of the
new unit could be guaranteed in a technically easy way by the rule of appreciation against
national currencies. However, once the new unit had replaced national currencies one was
left with the problem  of managing a single European currency according to the same
principle of stable purchasing power. Once conversion rates could no longer be relied
upon, the supply of the single currency would have to be tightly managed.
Anyway, a much more gradualist and managed approach was preferred by
European officials when the EMS was started, notably after 1982-83 when inflation
convergence was put high on the agenda. The emphasis was put on tightening central bank
cooperation gradually to eliminate the inflation differential between the high inflation
countries and those at the low end, particularly Germany. In other words, central bank
collaboration was preferred to the competitive process  inherent in the currency
competition of the All Saints Day Manifesto. Most of my co-signatories of the latter
disliked this alternative approach which they tended to label a central-bank cartel, unlikely
to have the same beneficial effect of reducing inflation as unfettered currency competition.
The suspicion was that there would be incentives for such a cartel to inflate together. The
stability of exchange rates would then endanger the achievement of low inflation even in
the prudent member states. Such a conflict could, in the view of the liberal economists,
only be resolved by subordinating exchange-rate objectives to the overriding aim of price
stability.16
In retrospect, the liberal economists underestimated the capacity of the European
policy-makers to strive simultaneously for external and internal stability, though it must
be admitted that their concerns did not seem unfounded for an important part of the
history of European monetary unification, arguably until the post-1992 period. Although
Germany was obviously happy to see to other EMS countries trying to emulate their
relatively better inflation performance through attachment to German monetary policy via
a fixed rate for the DM, “borrowing the credibility of the Bundesbank” was not a
complete solution to the potential conflict between the external and internal dimensions
of price stability. Two outcomes could be envisaged: either inflation rates would con-
verge at a low level  - in which case German monetary leadership would inevitably be
called into question by demands to share that leadership in a joint European framework -
or some inflation differentials would remain and gradually undermine the credibility of
fixed exchange rates. In the latter alternative countries with excess inflation might well
succeed in temporarily taking over the leadership from Germany and other low-inflation
countries, because the tendency of the former group to maintain higher nominal interest
rates would keep their currencies strong inside the EMS; for a while in 1989-90 the
Spanish and Italian currencies were typically trading at rates stronger than their central
rate for the DM, despite continuing excess inflation in Southern Europe. Such a situation
could endure for a while, but not indefinitely.
German unification from 1990 on gradually pushed up German inflation and
obliged the Bundesbank to raise interest rates. Monetary leadership was, at least in part,
restored, but the higher average inflation rate in the EMS removed some of the pressure
to reduce inflation elsewhere in Europe and opened up a debate as to what rate to aim for.
Was a rate of 4-5%, as observed in the early phase of the recession of 1991-93 about as
far as one ought to raise ambitions, or would progress towards zero inflation be justified
after weighing the output costs of reducing inflation against the benefits of a more stable
monetary unit?
The political answer came first and most clearly; an academic rationalization had
to wait a few more years. As recession spread there were few illusions that it could be
contained by more expansionary macroeconomic policies. Budgetary policies were
constrained by past excesses, notably the failure to consolidate significantly during the
upswing of the late 1980s which had left little room for manoeuvre when it subsequently17
2In the United States a commission, chaired by Michael Boskin, reported in 1995 that
in the United States the consumer price index may overstate the inflation rate to the extent of
at least one percentage point. 
became desirable to expand. Monetary policy was applied with great caution, may be in
retrospect excessive caution, in 1993-94, out of fear of rekindling inflation. The countries
that chose to abandon a fixed exchange rate for their currency, notably the United
Kingdom, Italy and Sweden, all opted for maintaining or reducing inflation. These three
countries adopted broadly similar anti-inflationary strategies with explicit inflation targets
below any recent historical experience as the focus. The task for them, as for those
countries which remained in the EMS, was much eased by the slack in their economies,
by structural improvements in their labour markets and, not least, by a favourable
international climate, marked by low prices of raw materials and increasing competition
from low-cost producers of manufactured goods outside the industrial countries. In the
most recent period inflation has fallen even below the rate of 2% which was long regarded
as fully satisfactory by the Bundesbank and recently referred to as the upper threshold of
a target range by the European Central Bank. We do not yet have in Europe any thorough
study of the size of the likely upward bias in the measurement of inflation conveyed by
national consumer price indices, or a fortiori by the harmonized index (HICP) calculated
by the ECB, but surely measured inflation of about 1% is for practical purposes an
indication of price stability
2. If anyone had suggested ten years ago, not to mention at even
earlier stages of Europe’s monetary integration, that such an objective should be set and
maintained over a long horizon, such a proposal would have attracted derision, protests
or both.
Why has political opinion and a large part of academic opinion endorsed a high
priority for price stability - and how has monetary policy come to be seen almost solely
as a means for maintaining a stable nominal framework - and regardless of the exchange
rate régime? These are the fundamental questions for anyone wanting to evaluate the
soundness of EMU as designed. Trying to provide answers would take me far beyond the
limits of this lecture. Let me just offer a rationalization for the objective of price stability.
It has not influenced the design of the Maastricht Treaty, yet it is not unreasonable to
suggest that policy-makers in this as in some other cases - insistence on full elimination
of exchange-rate uncertainty is another example discussed in the previous section - are
capable of developing solutions to policy issues which only somewhat later find more18
complete justifications in the academic literature.
At least some recent efforts at evaluating the net benefits of reducing the inflation
rate all the way to zero - corrected for possible inflation bias in the consumer price or
other index being used - should offer food for thought. There is an older literature, mostly
from three decades ago, on the optimal rate of inflation. The central contribution, see
Friedman (1969), stressed that the optimal rate of inflation was slightly negative in view
of the argument that if not the public would hold less than the optimum quantity of
monetary base (which can be produced costlessly). Others, notably Phelps (1973),
criticized this view by pointing out that in a second-best world inflation tax on money
holdings might be less distortionary than the alternative taxes which might otherwise be
imposed. But a comprehensive discussion of the costs and benefits of low inflation had
to wait for the recent period.
In a pioneering article Martin Feldstein (1996), performed an elaborate evaluation
of the net benefits of reducing inflation from 2% to zero, allowing for possible bias in the
measure of inflation. The costs are the temporary loss of output as inflation falls; they
depend crucially on the sluggishness of prices and wages. The benefits come from several
sources, one of which, but less important than others, is the increased willingness of the
public to hold a larger volume of non-interest bearing money at zero inflation. The most
important benefit is that zero inflation minimizes the distortionary effects of a nominal tax
system. Other benefits come from the impact on private saving and on demand for
housing, the main long-term asset in private portfolios. Feldstein estimates the net benefit
from zero rather than 2% inflation in a steady state to be equivalent to an increase in the
level of GDP of app. 1% year after year.
Given the presumed high degree of price and wage flexibility in the US economy
one would expect the costs of implementing such a policy strategy to be more modest than
in Europe where sluggishness in nominal variables is undoubtedly greater than in the
United States. This conclusion is borne out in studies of two European countries -
Germany and Spain - but at the same time the benefits of zero inflation also seem to be
larger, see Tödter and Ziebarth (1997) and Dolado et al. (1997) who follow the empirical
methodology of Feldstein. In Germany and Spain the net benefits of eliminating the
residual two percentage points of inflation therefore turn out to be very similar to, or a bit19
larger than, those found for the United States. A third study for a European country has
been carried out for the United Kingdom; here the net benefits are also found to be
positive, but only marginally so. Yet the main conclusion from this set of studies is that
there are indeed probable gains from going all the way to price stability in the full sense
of the term.
It is necessary to repeat that this research remains preliminary despite all the work
that has gone into it. If taken at face value it nevertheless suggests a net gain of an order
of magnitude similar to that found from the complete elimination of exchange-rate
variability inside Europe. In that case EMU presents a double gain to which external and
internal stability have contributed about equally and the total effect - a level of GDP a
couple of percentage points higher than would otherwise have been observed - is certainly
considerable. The ambition of European policy-makers in making a monetary union with
de facto zero inflation would then seem to be vindicated.
This double achievement is the core result of EMU with a stable currency.
Achieving also the other ambitions to which I now turn is clearly subsidiary to the
elimination of both exchange-rate variability and inflation. It is well-known, however, that
in order to make these two main achievements sustainable, threats to them should be
minimized. Such threats may come from three sources that could each potentially
undermine EMU: from large imbalances in the main other type of macroeconomic policy,
budget deficits, from large-scale interventions in the foreign-exchange market for the
single currency against other currencies, and from efforts to prevent financial instability.
Developing rules for non-monetary policies, then scope for coordinating them
From the start of this past decade’s debates on the design of EMU the role of
budgetary policies was controversial. Some - and I readily admit to have been among them
- thought that once exchange rates were locked definitively, the longer-term constraints
on budgetary decision-makers would be sufficiently severe to make outright rules for
budget deficits and debt superfluous. But I became convinced by the discussions in the
Delors Committee that this view was too sanguine. The argument in favour of some form
of “binding guidelines” for the upper limit to budget deficits in the member states
participating in EMU was primarily based on the likelihood that national governments20
3See notably Figure 7.2, p.87.
when freed of the risk of higher interest rates and possibly a currency crisis would react
by relaxing any effort to contain their public sector deficits. Any textbook analysis
suggests that the efficiency of tax and expenditure policies increases with the degree of
fixity of the exchange rate.
If only one or a few smaller member states succumb to this temptation there might
not be any important distortion to the aggregate policy stance. But there is no mechanism
to assure that the temptation will not be widespread in a monetary union. We may already
have seen this mechanism at work towards the end of the 1990s when several member
states failed to consolidate their budgets at a time of a relatively strong upswing. As the
EMS firmed up and governments became confident of the stability of the exchange-rate
framework, discretionary expansion largely offset the automatic im-provements on the
revenue side, as clearly illustrated in Buti and Sapir eds. (1998).
3 This mechanism was not
yet clearly perceived in the Delors Report, but the basic argument was presented as a
plausible hypothesis by Lamfalussy (1989) in an Annex to the Report, and it convinced
at least the central bankers that peer pressure based on clear rules of budgetary conduct
to contain divergent national behaviour had to substitute for some of the market discipline
imposed through higher premia in national interest rates. The idea was incorporated into
the Maastricht Treaty and further elaborated in the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP or
“Stability Pact”) proposed by Germany in 1995 and agreed at the Amsterdam European
Council in 1997. This final elaboration clarified both the procedure to be followed in
evaluating whether an excessive deficit had emerged in a country participating in EMU
and the precise nature of the sanctions to be imposed on a deviant country - issues that
had been left vague in the Treaty itself.
On balance, and having considered the alternatives, governments found it difficult
to escape the conclusion that mandatory upper limits to budget deficits - except in well-
defined “exceptional circumstances” - would be warranted in order to bolster the capacity
of the ECB to conduct a monetary policy directed at price stability as a primary objective.
Judging from the experience around the start of EMU it is easy to see that they were well
justified in not relying solely on the remaining elements of market discipline to contain
a plausible expansionary bias in budgetary policies; differentials between long-term21
4In the German case the major transfer from the Bundesbank to the government in
1998 reflecting the revaluation of gold reserves temporarily boosted the budgetary position by
about 0.4% of GDP.
government bond rates narrowed over the final months of 1998 to 20-30 basis points
despite a remarkable decline in the benchmark rate of the German Bunds. In contrast to
what some economists and market practitioners had argued, rising credit risk premia far
from substituted for rapidly declining currency risk premia, hence vindicating the
skepticism of central bankers that the former would constitute reliable discipline.
The main criticism of the admittedly somewhat arbitrary mechanism introduced
by the adoption of the Stability Pact is, however, that macroeconomic stabilization
policies may become too constrained if EMU participants, having lost their capacity to
conduct monetary and exchange-rate policies independently, also become unable to
protect themselves against the impact of asymmetric shocks through the working of
automatic budgetary stabilizers, occasionally supplemented by discretionary action. Here
it is necessary to distinguish between transitional problems and the longer-run properties
of the Stability Pact. For the more immediate future the problem is that several countries,
not least the two largest member states, have entered EMU with budget deficits which are
perilously high relative to their output gaps. Even a modest worsening of the economic
outlook in 1999-2000 could bring Germany and possibly France in conflict with the 3%
limit to budget deficits.
4 Hence the room for manoeuvre is extremely small and it would
clearly be damaging to confidence if the budgetary limit were to be breached already
within two years of the start of EMU. The ECB faces a difficult task in persuading
governments that for it to maintain - or even further ease the stance of monetary policy -
is contingent on more efforts at budget consolidation.
In a longer-term perspective the mechanism of the Stability Pact seems
unobjectionable. Its central element is the declared intention of governments to aim for
budget balance or a small surplus on average over the business cycle. This is a sensible
objective which marks a clear improvement over past behaviour. If adhered to, it would
leave considerable room for automatic stabilizers to work, particularly if countries where
deficits are most sensitive to the cycle accept that they would have to aim for a small
surplus as the normal state of affairs. Focussing on the average budget position over the
cycle would bring the budgetary rule close to the concept most economists would prefer22
5 For a useful survey, see Ter-Minassian (1997).
to see at centre stage: structural deficits. It would be far superior to sole focus on the
measured deficit and to the balanced budget amendments in existence e.g. in US states,
though such a rule can be justified in federations where the lower levels of government
have little or no macroeconomic stabilization functions.
Large Federal states use a variety of methods for imposing discipline on sub-
Federal levels of government, ranging from administrative controls in many developing
and transition countries to monitoring by financial markets where the latter are most
developed, e.g. Canada.
5 Intermediate forms such as rules or a cooperative approach in
annual negotiations are also observed. The Stability Pact clearly relies primarily on rules,
at least in the initial stage.
On balance, the Stability Pact with its apparently rigid rules and procedures
should help to put budgetary policies closer to the kind of medium-term stable path which
is already the aim of the joint monetary policy. As such it deserves to be credited rather
than just regarded as a side condition to monetary union which it became necessary to
fulfil simply because the German government insisted on it in order to placate its own
domestic opinion, still hostile to the single currency in the run-up to EMU. This latter
interpretation, not implausible in view of the zeal with which the Stability Pact was
presented by and in Germany, should not be the full story. The mandatory budgetary rules
and procedures have improved the prospects for an appropriate policy mix. They offer
some protection against erosion of the central achievement of very low and stable inflation
outlined in the previous section - and ultimately against threats to a break-up of the single-
currency area.
It is still questionable whether that in itself can be labelled as an achievement
meeting a fundamental ambition of EMU. Whatever one may think of the imposition of
constraints on national budgetary policies, this step does not qualify as coordination of
macroeconomic policies in the traditional sense of that term. At first sight the Stability
Pact appears to have superseded coordination of budgetary policies; the situation looks
similar to the position of the ECB which is committed to price stability as a primary
objective, leaving scope for output stabilization only when that objective is beyond
danger. But the analogy runs deeper than that; both the ECB and the national budgetary23
authorities will need from time to time to decide upon the desirable speed at which
economic disturbances that cause temporary departures from expected achievements - for
budgetary policies with respect to the output gap and unemployment - should be
eliminated. If, say, a negative output disturbance with potential inflationary consequence
is observed for (most of) the EMU participants, the ECB will need to consider how
rapidly future inflation can be brought back to its desired trajectory; analogously, the
ECOFIN Council, while continuing to insist on national budgetary deficits staying below
3% of GDP, will need to apply judgment in evaluating departures from previously
submitted Stability Programmes. In the opposite case where both inflation and budgetary
targets are undershot there may be a case for initiatives to shift the policy stance in a less
contractionary direction. Therefore, simple rule-bound budgetary policies prominent in
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact, useful as they are, will hardly be the full
story of economic policy-making in EMU, nor would they be accepted as such in the
European policy debate. They will in reality be supplemented by efforts at coordination
of a cooperative nature as outlined in the literature on fiscal federalism.
The ECOFIN Council has a natural mandate, in addition, to look at EMU-wide
aggregates, as the ECB is already obliged to do. Important indicators here are the
aggregate output gap and unemployment rate, the current account position of the euro area
and movements in the euro vis-a-vis the major currencies (see also the following section).
There have over the recent months been several signs that the ECOFIN Council, led by
the Euro-11 Finance Ministers, will wish to rise to this challenge and not just confine its
activities to the monitoring of compliance with the Stability Pact. This would make
economic sense and should bring two types of benefit, the first economic - to improve
macroeconomic policies - and the second political - to protect the ECB better against a
backlash of frustration of public opinion, if central bankers were perceived to be virtually
alone on the European policy stage. Some visible role for ECOFIN , or rather the Euro-11
Council, in the coordination of non-monetary policies may in fact protect rather than
endanger the independence of the ECB.
Supplementing the Stability Pact by extended policy coordination with the double
purpose of monitoring both individual budgetary behaviour inside the Stability Pact limits
and the aggregate policy stance is to-day the unfulfilled second half of the third ambition
for EMU which I have listed. It is of more recent vintage than the first two ambitions24
already discussed. But it has surfaced in earlier discussions of EMU as well. The Werner
Report of 1970 which presented the first outline of the final stage of EMU outlined an
advanced form of centralization of budgetary authority at the EU level. That went beyond
the politically feasible for a member of member states and the idea was explicitly rejected
as superfluous in the Delors Report. An additional reason for the change, rooted in
economic analysis, was that, over the twenty years between the publication of the two
reports, the degree of optimism concerning the capacity of budgetary policy to fine-tune
an economy had been significantly modified making the idea of vesting authority to try
to manage the tax and expenditure policies of a number of countries at the European level
look economically naive as well. When Roy Jenkins as Commission President in 1977
proposed to resume the debate on EMU his main concern was to develop a budgetary
stabilization function at the European level trough a much expanded EU budget to finance
public goods and effect transfers between the participating states in analogy to  what is
found in many large Federal states. But the amounts required were regarded as far beyond
the politically realistic and the debate on the Jenkins proposal soon ended. The present
ambition is in this perspective more realistic, modest and constructive. The strong push
now given to the recent version of the budgetary ambition, not least by France and
Germany, suggests that the ambition is firmly on the agenda.
Developing a potential role in the international monetary system
This fourth ambition has been present in Europe’s monetary unification at least
since the start of the EMS in 1978-79. To the fathers of that project, Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt and President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, tighter monetary integration was initially
a defensive move made necessary by unstable policies in the United States, in the long-
term a means of enhancing Europe’s role in the global monetary system. The first part of
that ambition has been fulfilled; as the EMS firmed up gradually, intra-EMS exchange
rates became less sensitive to movements in the US dollar than had been the case with
particular virulence in 1977-78; now that EMU is formed the last traces of the capacity
of USD-swings to push European cross rates apart have by definition disappeared. This
is in itself a major achievement; with only a small part of the foreign trade of the EMU
participants with the United States and countries that link their currency to the USD, the
potential harm to the EMU participants from global instability has been sharply reduced,
though certainly not eliminated.25
The second part of the international ambition remains unfulfilled, but the potential
to do so is now available. Some of the initial EMU participants, notably France, have
always regarded EMU as a stepping stone to global monetary reform; the emergence of
a single European currency could finally make a more managed international monetary
system feasible. This view was until recently - with the exception of Helmut Schmidt -
not shared by German leaders, but with the change of government in September 1998
German attitudes have converged much more closely towards French views, and both
governments have indicated an interest in examining the case for a target zone for the
euro’s exchange rate vis-a-vis the USD and possibly the yen; in the case of the latter the
Japanese authorities have voiced sympathy for the initiative, whereas the attitude of the
US authorities remains negative. The ECB has also poured cold water on the idea, fearing
that any obligation to maintain the euro within intervention margins against other
international currencies could prove incompatible with the ECB’s primary objective of
maintaining price stability.
The formal procedures governing any initiative by the EMU-participants with
respect to exchange rates are outlined in Art.109 of the Maastricht Treaty, which
distinguishes between “formal arrangements” and other situations. In the former case the
ECOFIN Council can unanimously decide to enter into them, having sought the view of
the ECB as to the consistency of the proposed arrangement with price stability. Once the
formal arrangements are in place, the ECOFIN Council can decide to “adopt, adjust pr
abandon” the central rate of the euro by qualified majority. In the absence of an ex-
change-rate system in relation to one or more non-EU currencies, the ECOFIN Council
may by qualified majority “formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy”, again
following consultations with the ECB. The Council has recently indicated that it will
discuss general orientations - the latter term was chosen in preference to “guidelines” used
elsewhere in the Treaty - in cases where the euro’s exchange rate is beginning to look
misaligned. Given the reluctance of both the ECB and the US authorities to engage in
exchange-rate stabilization it is highly doubtful whether these provision will lead to
anything really new. A unilaterally declared target zone for the euro could hardly qualify
as “formal arrangements” and would therefore imply only “general orientations”from the
ECOFIN Council . Even the Louvre Accord of 1987 which is the closest the main
industrial countries have come to agreeing on a target zone would presumably have to be26
a lot more specific and transparent before it could be regarded as formal. If the euro were
to appreciate sharply against other important currencies, mainly because it is taking
market share from the USD in private world financial portfolios, that may obviously sway
the attitude of the ECB and  make it more receptive to “general orientations” from the
ECOFIN Council.
Europe’s role in the international monetary system does not, however, stand and
fall with its capacity to negotiate a target-zone like arrangement with the US authorities,
although the avoidance of major unwarranted swings in the exchange rate between the
world’s two major currencies remains an important test. Fortunately the days when
European policy-makers could rightly lament about major imbalances in the US economy
- the sharp weakening of the USD in 1977-78 and the gyrations of the USD in the 1980s,
closely linked first to the emergence of the massive budget deficits under President
Reagan and subsequently to the market perceptions that the position was unsustainable
and the USD grossly overvalued, are the main examples - have been over for some time.
Europeans have much less to criticize at a time when the US Federal budget has swung
into substantial (and appropriate) surplus and the Fed’s monetary policy has succeeded
in keeping US output and employment performance much better than Europe’s and
without signs of a pick-up in inflation. Old confrontational attitudes die hard, but it may
well be that the past attractions of being able to challenge the United States through the
emergence of a strong European currency to compete with the dollar are no longer
relevant. This would certainly be true if the growth rate of output in the euro area were
to begin to match more closely that of the United States and the dollar were to weaken
moderately - both factors would then reduce the US current account deficit and the
European external surplus. These two factors will no doubt be seen to operate over the
next couple of years. But even the glaring current imbalance between the two regions is
difficult for the Europeans to criticize at a time when the US economy must be credited
with imparting the bulk of the remaining growth in world demand.
What is then the main challenge in the next few years, may be a decade, for
Europe to meet in reinforcing the international monetary system? It is to cooperate more
efficiently with the United States to contain international financial instability and improve
the much talked-about international financial architecture. Most urgently, it is to con-
tribute constructively to the containment of financial crises outside the industrial countries27
- of which a number of examples have been provided since the currency and banking
problems in Asia came to the attention of the international community in mid-1997.
             The euro area needs to meet three conditions in order to become an effective
player in the present difficult phase for the international monetary system. It has clearly
met the first by creating a unified currency area. It is beginning to meet the second: to
develop a tight rules-based system of regional surveillance, comprising also budgetary
policies - and hence the policy mix. Together these two first elements already have a
positive impact, simply by showing to other regions in the world the value of tight
regional integration comprising fully fixed exchange rates, non-zero inflation and a certain
degree of macroeconomic policy coordination. There will be a long way for other regions
to go in even beginning to emulate some of these achievements, yet the example will be
important. But Europe has hardly begun to meet the third condition for exercising an
influence commensurate with its economic and financial weight. The euro area needs to
develop an effective representation of its views in global fora.
Put crudely, there are currently far too many Europeans in the traditional
international fora: the G7 (or 8, as it has recently become with the inclusion of Russia),
the G10 and the Executive Board and the Interim Committee of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The fragmentation of the European presence paradoxically implies
a loss of influence despite the European capacity to outnumber other.
With the set-up of the ECB things are beginning to change, but very slowly.
Central bankers from the four large European countries apparently still intend to
participate in G7 meetings and other meetings with central bank input. On the side of the
budgetary authorities, European representation will even be enlarged; the four large
countries’ Finance Ministers will be accompanied by the President of ECOFIN (if he is
not from one of the four large countries) and a representative of the European Commis-
sion. This is the arrangement laboriously worked out and announced at the European
Council in Austria in December 1998. To American and other non-EU officials this makes
matters worse rather than better; from an outsider’s point of view the President of the
ECB and the President of ECOFIN would suffice, even though the short tenure of six
months of the latter does not exactly assure the kind of continuity in personal relations
which is important in international policy coordination.28
Irritation among US officials over the numerically strong EU presence in the G7
and the G10 no doubt contributed in 1998 to the set up of a new informal framework for
discussing some of the issues most central to reform of the international monetary system.
The US Secretary of the Treasury convened, at the time of the spring Meeting of the IMF
Interim Committee, three working parties consisting of representatives from the G7
countries and 15 emerging market countries to consider three sets of issues from the
agenda of the IMF (transparency, financial reforms, and private sector participation in
financial support packages). That structure squeezed out all the smaller EU member states
(and Spain); four of them have subsequently fought their way back into the caucus, the
future of which is reportedly uncertain at the present stage. Finally, the EU constituencies
in the IMF bodies do not reflect present realities after the start of EMU; some constituen-
cies mix EU and non-EU member states, while one EU-country (Ireland) is in the
Canadian constituency.
Some of these deficiencies - at least from the viewpoint of effective EU
representation - are clearly less serious than others and will anyway take some time to
remedy. Others could be addressed with some urgency. The excessive central bank
representation in the G7 reflects the highly decentralized way in which the ECB has
initially been implemented, operationally as well as in its analytic and policy-formulating
role. That may gradually be rectified, as will the surprising continuation of the
representation of the national central banks of the euro area in the Economic and Financial
Committee (formerly the Monetary Committee) which prepares issues on the agenda of
the ECOFIN Council. In view of the likely international agenda with emphasis on
containing international financial crises the composition of these bodies and their
international representation is of some considerable interest to the outside world.
The US Treasury is usually able to act quickly and decisively in international
crises because it has a unified political leadership; the present office holders, Secretary
Robert Rubin and his Deputy, Larry Summers, are necessarily at the centre of interna-
tional economic efforts. The Europeans may be jealous - and sometimes critical - of their
efforts in which would like to have more of a role rather than being informed subsequently
when events and financial rescue packages have already taken shape. If the European
Finance Ministers can not for sometime designate an external representation which is both29
effective and acceptable to all member states, is it too much to hope that they could at
least designate someone just below their level to coordinate European views? There has
been much discussion in recent month about the now imminent designation of a high-level
representative for the common foreign and security policy where national attitudes are
typically further apart than in the international economic area. There seems to be a strong
case for a similar figure in international economic affairs. A natural candidate for such a
“State Secretary for International Economic Affairs” could be the Chairman of the
Economic and Financial Committee; that might be preferable to a representative of the
European Commission (in analogy to the role of the Commission the trade policy field),
since the Commission’s authority in economic policy is not strongly developed. Of
course, such a European counterpart to Mr. Larry Summers would have some congenital
weaknesses relative to the latter until the euro area has advanced further in its non-
monetary integration and coordination. But the point is that the process could be advanced
significantly by such a procedural step.
In short, it takes more than establishing a solid single currency to develop
Europe’s potential role in to-day’s international monetary system. Given the institutional
complexities of external representation the euro area - and even more the EU as a whole -
is still far from “speaking with one voice” in international fora. May be it will take a
major international crisis to being about.30
6The following is largely based on Statement No.2 by the European Shadow Regula-
tory Committee of which I  am a member. 
Developing a European profile in financial supervision
One may discuss whether this final ambition should have been included at all. Not
only is it largely unrealized, it is not even an ambition widely shared by European
officials. Rather, it is a task which financial instability is likely to thrust upon financial
supervisors and the ECB. Therefore I would argue that it should be an ambition.
When the Maastricht Treaty and the ECB Statute annexed thereto were negotiated
nearly a decade ago the majority view was that the ECB should not be considered directly
responsible for financial stability. Prudential control of financial institutions and markets
was to remain in the hands of national authorities. The reasons for this design were
complex. As in the area of budgetary policy the general principle of subsidiarity appeared
to suggest leaving responsibility for financial stability in the hands of those closest to the
problems. Two additional reasons we also given: some central banks were not in charge
of financial supervision in their domain, hence making it institutionally more difficult to
envisage vesting this authority in the ECB after the start of EMU. Some important central
banks, notably the Bundesbank, and several political authorities felt that responsibility for
monetary stability - the main task of the ECB - could be undermined by widening the list
of objectives. Anyway, the issue of who is in charge of financial supervision - central
banks or separate agencies - is subsidiary to whether the task is sufficiently well
coordinated at the European level in view of the higher level of financial integration after
the start of EMU.
6
Coordination between national supervisors in the EU is to-day based on bilateral
memoranda of understanding. It seems important in EMU to intensify cooperation
between supervisors and central banks and to underpin it by clear EU-wide agreement on
a code of conduct covering supervisory responsibilities and standards in order to avoid
misunderstandings, institutional rivalry, and excessive forbearance by national supervisors
and to ensure that all financial institutions are adequately supervised by a lead regulator.
The ECB could play a role as a clearing house for such a cooperative arrangement which
should, in particular, make clear provisions for the allocation of responsibilities in times31
of crises. Such coordination at the EU level would represent an important contribution to
global financial stability.
There is a surprising degree of ambiguity in the framework of the ECB and the
national central banks participating in EMU with respect to lender-of-last-resort
operations. Financial stability may occasionally require the capacity to conduct such
operations.
The decentralized framework with operational activities carried out through the
national central banks implies that conflicts may arise between the provision of liquidity
to national institutions and the ECB’s responsibility for determining liquidity in the euro
area as a whole. An interest-rate subsidy to a local problem bank may in the end be paid
for by banks in other EMU countries and by their costumers. For these reasons, and
because of the need to preserve competitive equity, procedures for lender-of-last-resort
operations should be clearly allocated between the ECB and national central banks. These
agreed procedures should include adequate collateral, penal interest rates and prior
authorization rather than simple monitoring by the ECB for the injection of liquidity by
a participating national central bank.
Conclusions
There is to-day a much clearer perception of what EMU implies than Robert
Marjolin foresaw in his critical review of 1975 and in his Memoirs a decade later.
I listed five ambitions which have gradually evolved as the project progressed
towards realization. There is a logical order in them, as we look back over the past two
decades since the start of the EMS. Increasingly rigid exchange rates - an important
benefit in themselves - required convergence of national inflation rates, hence raising the
issue of who should exercise the n-th degree of freedom in an increasingly joint monetary
policy. Basically, such a policy required an explicit stand on the principal objective of
monetary policy - to provide a stable nominal framework for the area as a whole. With the
inflationary experience of the 1970s and early 1980s still fresh un the minds of policy-
makers, this issue was settled in a clear and forceful way in the Maastricht Treaty and
recent research has confirmed that the gains of near-zero inflation are likely to be32
substantial and must not be put at undue risk.
Even the most virtuous central bank is not, however, fully in charge of the factors
that may cause inflation. A monetary policy aiming at price stability can be undermined
by large-scale public sector deficits, intervention obligations vis-a-vis other important
currencies and financial crises which appear to require significant injections of liquidity.
A purist might say that, in order to preserve to the maximum the capacity of the ECB to
meet its primary objective, monetary policy should be protected fully against these three
factors. The tools for assuring that are, respectively, rules for maximum public sector
deficits, no obligations to intervene in foreign-exchange markets, and no role for the ECB
in solving financial crises.
The Maastricht Treaty is imbued with this spirit. It emphasizes constraints on
deviant national budgetary policies, subsequently reinforced by the Stability Pact, it makes
an exchange-rate policy for the euro area very difficult to envisage, and it gives no
important role to the ECB in financial supervision. The degree to which these purist side
conditions for EMU was imposed was impressive - and surprising given the ambitions
which were also present, though less prominently, to improve the coordination of non-
monetary policies among the EMU-participants, to allow the euro area to fill its potential
role in the international monetary system and to assure a high degree of financial stability.
We are now entering an interesting phase where these three remaining ambitions
reassert themselves. The Euro-11 Finance Ministers will push the ECOFIN Council
towards additional budgetary coordination and towards a more aggregate view of the
EMU policy mix, particularly in a more global context. With a less conflictual
international agenda there is scope for a constructive contribution from the euro area to
the resolution of global economic problems, notably financial crises, but the issue of more
effective external representation remains to be resolved. Finally, there is increasing
awareness (though still only moderate) that financial supervision needs to be better
coordinated after the arrival of the euro and that the role of the lender-of-last-resort
function needs to be more clearly specified and allocated.
The re-emergence of these three ambitions - or at least of the first two of them -
is natural now that the two major and most important achievements of eliminating all33
exchange-rate variability and, for practical purposes, all inflation in the euro area have
been obtained. There is some scope for realising the remaining three ambitions while still
assuring that the first two are always kept in mind.34
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